|Bat example, philosophy: (Literature Th Nagel, What is it like to be a bat, Philosophical Review 83 (October). 435-50 (1974).) While most people believe to be able to imagine how it would be for them to be a bat, according to Nagel this is not the point. The problem is that we cannot imagine what it is like for a bat to be a bat. See also subjectivity, objectivity, privileged access, introspection, imagination._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Bat Example/Nagel/Chalmers: equipped with the approach of Crick and Koch, we may get even more insight into how it is to be a bat. Functional organization can tell us something about the kind of information a bat has access to. The distinctions which it is capable of making, and thus also classifications of the most prominent things in its field of perception.
Bat/Chalmers: this of course shows nothing about the intrinsic nature of the experiences of bats, but Akins (1993) can add something to this.
Chalmers: Cheney/Seyfarth (1990) How Monkeys See the World tries to answer such questions about bats by puting us into the mind of other species.
Bat Example/Chalmers: Why should not we suppose there is a way for a thermostat of "How it is to be a thermostat"?
Such an "experience" could occur like a lightning and completely without concept.
For the thermostat, there is a canonical information space, and so we can say he has the canonical experiences of a thermostat.
The experiences of a thermostat can be called proto-phanomenal._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996
Constructing the World Oxford 2014