Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Dualism: the idea that the entities in a considered domain cannot be unified. In philosophy e.g. spirit and matter. Monism in contrast, confirms that unity is possible and that a separateness can not be claimed. Sie also property dualism, monism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 125
Dualism/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that materialism failed because of the lack of logical supervenience of conscious experience on physical facts. This is followed by a dualism, but not a Cartesian dualism, which assumes a "mind in the machine", which performs extra causal work. Instead, for us, a kind of property duelism follows. > Property dualism/Chalmers.
I 134
Dualism/Chalmers: you could avoid the dualism by referring to a zombie world that is physically identical to ours as being described as false.
I 135
This world would at the same time be identical and different. We could make the physical properties rigid with the operator "dthat", e.g. dthat (plays the role of ...).
N.B.: then the zombie world would not have some features that our world has.
N.B.: then consciousness could metaphysically supervene on other properties. That would be an interesting argument.
ChalmersVsVs: 1. this is speculative.
2. (more direct): it is based on an incorrect semantics of physical concepts.
I 136
For example, an electron with unrecognized properties would still be called an electron, but not an electron with the properties of a proton.
Metaphysics/Chalmers: semantics is not so decisive here, but the metaphysical question remains.
I 154
Dualism/Definition Proto-phanomenal property/Chalmers: involves as the only one not experiencing itself, but several simultaneously existing could have this. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal.
To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded.
I 155
Dualism/Chalmers: if we were to take such a position, we would represent an essential dualism.
ChalmersVsDualism: one can also understand this position non-dualist, albeit not as a materialistic monism. It then provides a network of intrinsic properties that "realizes" the extrinsic physical properties. The laws are still the physical ones. In extreme form, when all intrinsic properties are phenomenal, we are dealing with a variant of idealism, but according to Berkeley's type.
It would most likely correspond to a version of Russel's neutral monism:
I 155
Monism/Russell/Chalmers: neutral monism: the fundamental properties of the world are neither physical nor phenomenal, but the physical and the phenomenal are both built up from this fundamental. The phenomenal is formed from the intrinsic natures, the physical from the extrinsic.
I 156
Dualism/Definition Interactionistic Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process.
ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism.
Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)
I 157
ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to cause any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter examples:
VsInteractionistic Dualism/VsInteractionism/Chalmers:
1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random.
2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently.
ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain if the wave function collapses.
ChalmersVsInteractionistic Dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant.
I 158
ChalmersVsEccles: if there are psychons, then they can manage with purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties.
VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties.
ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus this adheres to the causal unity of the physical.
ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: even if one were assuming psychones, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychones. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychones without being able to prove them.
I 162
Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is non-physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role.
I 162
Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: so I characterize my own view: Thesis: Consciousness supervenes naturally on the physical, without supervening logically or "metaphysically". I argue that materialism is wrong and that the realm of physical is causally completed.
I 171
Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: my position is already implicitly shared by many who still call themselves "materialists". All I have done is to make the ontological implications of the naturalistic view explicit - that consciousness "emerges" from the physical. We do not have to give up much, what is important for our scientific world.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-07-16
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