Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Consciousness, philosophy: The experience of differences along with a knowledge about alternatives as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also intentionality, identity theory, other minds.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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David Chalmers

Definition The Easy Problem/Consciousness/Chalmers: “easy” problems of consciousness: How does the brain process environmental stimulation?
How does it integrate information?
How do we produce reports on internal states?
If you only work on the "easy” problem, you get one sort of theory; if you believe, that there is a further “hard” problem, then you get another.
Definition The Hard Problem of Consciousness/Chalmers: Why is all this processing (of stimulation, of information) accompanied by an experienced inner life?
Thesis: The standard methods of neuroscience and cognitive science do not work in addressing them.
I 4
Central is experience, but it is not definition. It is fruitless to define conscious experience in terms of more primitive notions.
I 5
When I am talking about it here, I mean only the subjective quality of experience. ((s) And this is not to be confused with self-experience).
I 26
Consciousness/Chalmers: also this term has two aspects:
A) psychological (behavior explaining, functional) - concerns reports and introspective accessibility to information. (From now on called "consciousness").
B) phenomenal (>Qualia, Qualities).
Psychological Consciousness/Chalmers: psychological consciousness is introspection, alertness, ability to reflect the content of mental states, self-awareness.
Consciousness/Chalmers: as almost the only phenomenon, conscious experience does not logically supervene on something else.
Otherwise, virtually all natural phenomena are globally logically supervenient to facts about atoms, electromagnetic fields, etc.
But that does not mean that all higher-level properties are based on micro-physical laws.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Cha I
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-03-22