|Intention: the will to commit an act, as opposed to a random occurrence of such an event. See also motives, causation, will._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Intentions/Chalmers: There are arguments for intentions, similar to conscious experience that they...
...cannot logically supervene on physical and phenomenal properties. (See Kripke's Wittgenstein and Chalmers I 368).
ChalmersVs: in fact, intentional properties must logically supervene on these, if they are to be instantiated at all. Therefore, there is no particular ontological problem with intentionality._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996
Constructing the World Oxford 2014