Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 277
Knowledge/Pain/Skepticism/Nonfactualism/Fact/Putnam: We can easily see that the specific facts which are related to when we say "know" and when not, are not simply "pragmatic" in the sense of an antithesis to assumed "semantic" properties of the ordinary language.
If we assume that it is possible to speak in any context of "knowledge" in an assertive sense, the skeptic will win by asking for proofs which we cannot give.

Stroud: "claiming meaning" = "literary use" of "knowledge". (Terminology). That is, that questions like "What are your proofs" are appropriate.

Knowledge/Putnam: the language games with "know" in the claiming function succeed precisely because there are contexts in which the word "know" is meaningless! (> Moore's hands).
Cavell II St. Cavell Müssen wir meinen was wir sagen? aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Phil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

II 191
Knowledge/Situation/Cavell: it happens that we know everything about a situation but do not know "what is x?" This question then becomes very puzzling, precisely in the sense in which the whole of philosophy is puzzling.
We must remember (with Socrates) what we would normally say.
"What would we say here?" is the same as "What is the situation?"

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

> Counter arguments against Cavell
> Counter arguments in relation to Knowledge

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25