Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Universals: universals are expressions for what objects may have in common, e.g. a certain color. Examples for universals are redness, roundness, difference, value. The ontological status of universals as something independent of thought - that is, their existence - is controversial. Nevertheless it is undisputed that we form terms for generalization and successfully use them. See also general terms, general, generalization, ontology, existence, conceptual realism, realism, ideas, participation, sortals, conceptualism, nominalism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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I 185
Wittgenstein/Cavell: both deny, contrary to most other philosophers, that conformity with criteria (a sign of intelligible speech) can be justified by reference to universals.
I 213
Universals/Cavell: my knowledge of the application cannot go beyond the explanation of the respective individual case! Thus, no universal or definition can represent my knowledge as it were.
A source of the (erroneous) stimulus of universals lies in the different function of subject and predicate.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

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> Counter arguments against Cavell
> Counter arguments in relation to Universals

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-03-24