Books on Amazon
Language/Universals/Wittgenstein/Cavell: we project words from one context to the next, but without relying on any definitions or rules. For the most part (not always) we do not need universals as a fundamentalist premise.
Skepticism here would only look for new universals here.
Language learning/language acquisition: the entry into our culture is not guaranteed by something essential.
The projection is instead guaranteed by our agreement in the judgment.
Our words occur in an unlimited number of cases and projections, and their variance is not arbitrary.
Cavell II St. Cavell Müssen wir meinen was wir sagen? aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Phil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Language Philosophy/Cavell: this is not so much about revengeing sensational offenses against the intellect, as to remedy its civilian misconduct.
We must return tyrannizing ideas (such as existence, certainty, identity, reality, truth ...) to their specific contexts in which they function normally, so that they can function normally without corrupting our thinking.
Language/World/Cavell: the transition from language to the world occurs imperceptibly when Austin says "We can voluntarily make a gift" (general statement) is a "material mode" (Mates) for "The gift was made voluntary" (special case).
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002