Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 13
Skepticism/Cavell: his skeptical impulse is bound to the belief that we must (and be able to) speak outside of the limits of the language game.
The lack of a secure connection between words and the world is not a mistake of language but lies in the way we use it in our lives with language.
I 22
Skepticism/Cavell: skepticism is more a dodge from the other person, a rejection of responsibility and perils. This has a certain tragic dimension that Cavell finds in Shakespeare and Ibsen.
I 42
Belief/Cavell: The points at which the philosophers interfere with each other or with the healthy common understanding are not about "beliefs".
The skeptic's challenge is not against our beliefs, but against the reason on which our beliefs are based, our ability to believe at all.
Skepticism/Cavell: skepticism may not be reason, but it cannot be harder to understand it than irrationality.
The first fact that comes to light through him is that the vocation to what we say is not equal to a testimony what we all believe.
I 43
It seems as if the critic of skepticism must not prove that the skeptic must accept his truth in the end, but that his own test failed.
CavellVs: but it is not a matter of agreeing here on individual propositions!
(Like Wittgenstein): we do not believe, for example, that the world exists! It would also be empty, e.g. to agree on that it exists! You could also immediately decide that it exists! It is not about reconciling diverging positions.

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

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> Counter arguments in relation to Skepticism

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23