Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Rules, philosophy: rules are restrictions of a domain of possibilities for subjects, communities or functionaries, or generally for acting individuals or groups. Rules may be implicit or explicit, and may be implemented by ordinance or by jointly developing equally authorized participants, e.g. in a discourse. In another sense, rules can be understood as actual regularities that can be discovered by observation. These rules can be discovered not only in action, but also in the nature of objects such as linguistic structures. See also norms, values, rule following, private language, language rules, discourse, ethics, morality, cognitivism, intuitionism, society, practice._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stanley Cavell on Rules - Dictionary of Arguments
II 184 Rules/Cavell: contrary to a widespread idea rules do not always have something to do with commands. Thesis: there is a complementarity of rules and determinations. II 185 You can describe an actual action, or perform it according to rules. II 186 Now one can say according to binding rules that it is wrong (an abuse) to say "I know it" if one is not sure. The only relevant condition is that one speaks grammatically correct. It follows, however, that our statements S, T, and T' are not only non-analytic, but also not synthetic! (not like, for example, the synthetic statement that someone who dresses himself voluntarily dresses himself). For example, the determination in question are similar to "The future will be the past" but: If the future is not "like" the past, no one will be surprised by that. II 196 Rule/determination/Cavell: there is a complementarity between the two. How could we overlook it? Because of the false assumption that a rule must be in imperative ("You should") instead of simply describing how something is done. II 197 Rule/Cavell: I do not deny that they can never be associated with imperatives, but only that this is always possible. E.g. Chess: I probably forget to say "J'adoube", so I have to be brought to do it... II 198 ...but I do not forget how the trains are made. I do not have to be brought to do this. Cf. >Chess. II 201 Rule/Principle/Cavell: Difference: Rules say how to do a thing, Principles tell you how to make a thing good! >Principles, cf. >Laws._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.), Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18