Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Rules, philosophy: rules are restrictions of a domain of possibilities for subjects, communities or functionaries, or generally for acting individuals or groups. Rules may be implicit or explicit, and may be implemented by ordinance or by jointly developing equally authorized participants, e.g. in a discourse. In another sense, rules can be understood as actual regularities that can be discovered by observation. These rules can be discovered not only in action, but also in the nature of objects such as linguistic structures. See also norms, values, rule following, private language, language rules, discourse, ethics, morality, cognitivism, intuitionism, society, practice.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Cavell II St. Cavell Müssen wir meinen was wir sagen? aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Phil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

II 184
Rules/Cavell: contrary to a widespread idea rules do not always have something to do with commands.
Thesis: there is a complementarity of rules and determinations.
II 185
You can describe an actual action, or perform it according to rules.
II 186
Now one can say according to binding rules that it is wrong (an abuse) to say "I know it" if one is not sure.
The only relevant condition is that one speaks grammatically correct.
It follows, however, that our statements S, T, and T' are not only non-analytic, but also not synthetic! (not like, for example, the synthetic statement that someone who dresses himself voluntarily dresses himself).
For example, the determination in question are similar to "The future will be the past" but:
If the future is not "like" the past, no one will be surprised by that.
II 196
Rule/determination/Cavell: there is a complementarity between the two. How could we overlook it?
Because of the false assumption that a rule must be in imperative ("You should") instead of simply describing how something is done.
II 197
Rule/Cavell: I do not deny that they can never be associated with imperatives, but only that this is always possible.
E.g. Chess: I probably forget to say "J'adoube", so I have to be brought to do it...
II 198
...but I do not forget how the trains are made. I do not have to be brought to do this.
II 201
Rule/Principle/Cavell: Difference: Rules say how to do a thing,
Principles tell you how to make a thing good!

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

> Counter arguments against Cavell
> Counter arguments in relation to Rules

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-23