|Justification, philosophy: justification is a condition for knowledge which a) is fulfilled or not fulfilled by the explanation of the origin of the information or b) by a logical examination of the argument. For a), theories such as the causal theory of knowledge or reliability theories have been developed. See also verification, examination, verification, proofs, externalism.|
Justification in a broader sense is a statement about the occurrence of an action or a choice. See also explanations, ultimate justification, reasons._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
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|Cavell II St. Cavell Müssen wir meinen was wir sagen? aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Phil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Moral/Ethics/Cavell: attempts of persuasion ("You should") represent not the paradigm but the collapse of morality.
Justification/Cavell: just like this we can see justifications as the collapse of our conventions.
The assumption that the appeal to a rule is only justified, if this rule itself is justified, can make such an appeal seem only hypocritical.
Rule/Determination/Cavell: There is a complementarity between the two. How could we overlook it?
Because of the false assumption that a rule must be an imperative ("you should") instead of simply describing how something is done.
Apology/Cavell: if there were corresponding duties for all excuses, there would be no excuses and action would be intolerable. We are not bound in any action to make sure that none of the vast amounts of possibilities happens where something goes wrong._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002