|Norms, ethics, philosophy: norms define which actions are permitted, advisable or prohibited when certain circumstances are present. The philosophical discussion deals mainly with questions of its justification.|
Books on Amazon
|Cavell II St. Cavell Müssen wir meinen was wir sagen? aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Phil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Norms/Normative/Normativity/Cavell: Normativity is not in the assertions of the philosopher of the everyday language.
Traditional problems with the concept of normativity stem from the following confusions:
1. the (wrong) idea, descriptive utterances are the opposite of normative utterances.
2. prescriptive utterances are typical examples of normative utterances.
Ad 1. typical of actions is that they can go wrong. But then descriptive statements do not represent the opposite of normative statements, but rather presuppose them. We could not do what we call describing, if the language did not comprehend us with consummation forms that are normative for describing.
Ad. 2. If normative expressions are used to institutionalize rules, then prescriptive utterances are not examples of normative utterances.
Formulating a norm does not mean to indicate how we should perform an action, but how the action is done!
Specifying what we should do is not to institutionalize a norm, but rather presupposes the existence of a norm!
Language/Norms/Cavell: We sometimes invoke standards which our interlocutor does not accept, but we do not try to institutionalize our own norms, nor to express our subjective views.
There are always different normative possibilities to fulfill the particular normative tasks.
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002