Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Tyler Burge
Frank I 698
Knowledge/Thought/Enabling Conditions/Burge: We do not ask anyone to assure themselves that the light is not being deflected by a mirror or that he is not facing a dummy when he takes a piece of bread.
In fact, it is part of our common understanding of the objectivity of perception that there is no general guarantee for distinguishing something from an imitation. The possibility of deception (error) is part of the essence of the objectivity of perception.
This is true in every-day life, but even in philosophy it is true that perception knowledge does not require knowledge about the enabling conditions.
Frank I 704
Knowledge/Self-Knowledge/Content/Perception Knowledge/Burge: if the background conditions are so different that there is a different reference object in their own self-referential thinking, then they are so different that there is another thought.
But the person remains in the same reflexive position, in turn, to authoritatively know what she thinks.
E.g. in a slow transition from the earth to twin earth, the epistemic claims are justified if the person thinks "I'm thinking that water/twin-earth water is a liquid." They are right in both cases.
Burge: the fact that the person knows nothing about the changeover is irrelevant to the truth and justification of the judgments!
((s) Because of the interaction with the environment? Then there can be only a "naive use" of "water"?)
The answer to the question of a person who has noticed the conversion "Do I now think of water or twin-water?" is obvious: both! Because both terms are needed!

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


> Counter arguments against Burge
> Counter arguments in relation to Knowledge



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25