|Folk psychology, everyday psychology: are expressions for psychological theories describing mental processes and states with everyday concepts and have the claim to provide explanations for these mental processes and conditions with everyday terms. The claim of these theories is based, among other things, on the fact that our experiences are ultimately not exhaustively covered by physical descriptions. See also physicalism, reductionism, reduction, qualia, sensations, explanations._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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|Shiffer I 37
BurgeVsFolk Psychology/Intention-Based Semantics//IBS/BurgeVsIBS/BurgeVsGrice/Schiffer: Burge's counter-examples are more interesting. They differ from the twin-earth examples in two points:
(I) at first sight they also make a strong objection VsIBS by seemingly demonstrating that the content of belief is sometimes a function of the meaning of the word in the linguistic community.
(II) Def "Environment-Dependent"/Role/Terminology/Burge/Schiffer/: let's say: a functional role is dependent on the environment if we cannot know whether a system is in a state that has the role F without knowing what the environment looks like.
Dependent on the Environment: e.g. "every token of x is caused in y when he sees a cat": this is environment-dependent. ((s)> Putnam: "cat-single-sign-trigger").
CSF: common-sense functionalism
Twin EarthVsCSF/Schiffer: the arguments work there, because they are environment-independent. This may spur a hope for a scientific functionalism, for a theory with T-correlated functional roles that are environment-dependent.
BurgeVsFunctionalism: (Burge 1979, example turned classic, also Burge 1982a, 1982b):
E.g. Alfred's use of "arthritis" involves more than the correct use limited to inflammation of the joints. He thinks it is similar to rheumatism and says "I have arthritis in the thigh".
Burge: Alfred has a wrong belief. Shiffer dito.
w: World where Alfred has the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh.
In w, Alfred has the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh
w' is a possible world that is different from the other only in that Alfred's use of "arthritis" is correct there. It is accepted by the language community. (s) The language community mistakenly believes that it is possible to have arthritis in the thigh. The community as a whole is wrong (except for the doctors)). Then, Alfred's belief there is also true.
In w', Alfred does not have the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh.
For this belief is false (because arthritis is only an inflammation of the joints. But the belief he has is true on its own!) ((s) He has the belief that he has a disease of which it is generally believed that he could have in the thigh. His word "arthritis" then has a different content than in w).
BurgeVsCSF: in w , Alfred is in exactly the same T* -correlated states as we are in w. Therefore, if CSF were correct, he would express the same belief in both. But he does not. Therefore, CSF must be incorrect. ((s) Alfred does not assert in w' to believe this (and does not believe it), but then there are two differences between w and w'?)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010