Dictionary of Arguments

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Content: content is that part of a statement, what can be represented by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Frank I 670
Content/Intentional State/Davidsons/Putnam/Burge: of ordinary propositional attitudes cannot be explained solely by physical, phenomenal, causally functional, algorithmic (computational) or syntactic states. The physical and social environment must be considered.


Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Burge II
Tyler Burge
"Two Kinds of Consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


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> Counter arguments against Burge
> Counter arguments in relation to Content

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-03-26
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