|Frank I 691f
Thinking/externalism/Burge: what thoughts you can have depends on how you relate to your surroundings - a person does not need to explore his/her surroundings to know what his/her thoughts are.
Internalism/DescartesVsBurge: the possibility of deception is supposed to prove that we can doubt the world while knowing our thoughts authoritatively - i.e. supposedly independencies from the world.
Solution: ArnauldVsDescartes: Self-identification is not sufficient to know that mental events are independent of objects. The cogito does not provide knowledge about the (indexical, external) individuation conditions.
Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of
Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010
"Two Kinds of Consciousness"
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994