|Attributive/referential: difference in reference - attributive "whoever it is" (may not be identified) - referential the identified object._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Frank I 702/703
Content/BurgeVsDonellan/Intentionality/Intentional Content/Reference/Referential/Attributive: E.g. If the person I regard as amiable is not my aunt, then I am not mistaken in what I think about the person, no mistake with regard to the intentional act and content (!).
The authority concerns those aspects of thought which have intentional qualities. For me, this is the only aspect of the content of a thought._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010
"Two Kinds of Consciousness"
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994