|Judgment: the use of the concept „judgment“ is not uniform. If the judgment is interpreted as the determination of the truth value ("true" or "false") of a statement, this is indicated explicitly, e.g. with the judgment stroke I- introduced by G. Frege. See also truth value, judgment stroke, sentence, statement, utterance, assertion._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Chisholm II = Johann Christian Marek Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986
Chisholm II 231
Judgment/Brentano: Judgments are obvious from the concepts precisely when they are judgments about concepts.
Concept/Brentano: Knowledge about concepts is directly evident from inner perception.
From the existence of a conceptual relation, however, it does not follow yet that we acknowledge it. It must be made accessible to the perception.
Judgment/false/Brentano/Marek: Wrong judgment on concepts is therefore a modifying determination, such as e.g. "false gold". A wrong judgment is not a judgment at all.
((s): Frege would say: a false judgment is always about an object, not a concept.)
Truth/Evidence/Truth-Functional/Brentano/Marek: That there can nevertheless be a dispute about conceptual truth can be explained by the fact that not every judgment about concepts must be evident. Blind, non-evident judgments are also conceivable. For example, if you only trust authorities. But these are also real judgments.
Judgments are plausible precisely when the conceptual relationship is understood.
_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004