Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Chisholm II = Johann Christian Marek Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie in Philosophische Aus├Ątze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm II 231
Judgment/Brentano: Judgments are obvious from the concepts precisely when they are judgments about concepts.
Concept/Brentano: Knowledge about concepts is directly evident from inner perception.
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II 232
From the existence of a conceptual relation, however, it does not follow yet that we acknowledge it. It must be made accessible to the perception.
Judgment/false/Brentano/Marek: Wrong judgment on concepts is therefore a modifying determination, such as e.g. "false gold". A wrong judgment is not a judgment at all.
((s): Frege would say: a false judgment is always about an object, not a concept.)
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II 233
Truth/Evidence/Truth-Functional/Brentano/Marek: That there can nevertheless be a dispute about conceptual truth can be explained by the fact that not every judgment about concepts must be evident. Blind, non-evident judgments are also conceivable. For example, if you only trust authorities. But these are also real judgments.
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II 234
Judgments are plausible precisely when the conceptual relationship is understood.

Brent I
F. Brentano
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-27