|Consciousness, philosophy: The experience of differences along with a freedom of choice as opposed to purely automatic responses. See also intentionality, identity theory, other minds.|
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|Chisholm I 130
Unity of Consciousness/Brentano: (Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Hamburg, 1973, S. 227f): if a person imagines something, or at the same time imagines several objects, he also recognizes at the same time the simultaneity of both. For example, if one hears a melody, he hears the one tone as present while he perceives the other as past. ... in which of the experiences is the idea of their simultaneity? In none!
On the contrary, it is clear that the inner cognition of the one with the other belongs to the same real unity.
Consciousness/Chisholm/Unity/Brentano/Chisholm: suggests the following principle: if it is certain for x that it is F and also that it is G, then it is also certain that it is F and G.
This seems unquestionable on the basis of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception.
ChisholmVs: it seems to be too strict, however.
Kant: the subject, does not need to unite the ideas, it only needs to appear that it could.
EP 4 if it is true for x that it is F, and also that it is G, and it is considering the question whether it is both F and G, then it is certain for it.
This also applies to proposed premises.
Chisholm II =
Klaus Hedwig Brentano und Kopernikus in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Ed.), Amsterdam 1986
Chisholm II 269
Consciousness/Brentano/Hedwig: Brentano has never admitted the psychological abyss of consciousness, but always insisted on the uniqueness of thinking.
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004