Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Negation, philosophy, logic: negation of a sentence. In logic, this is done by prefixing the negation symbol. Colloquially expressed by the word "not", which can be at different positions in the sentence. If the negation refers only to one sentence part, this must be made clear by the position, e.g. a predicate can be denied without negating the whole sentence. In logic, therefore, inner and outer negation is distinguished by the use of different symbols.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data

Books on Amazon:
Paul Boghossian
Wright I, 276
Negation/Logic/Truth/Correctness/correct: If both truth and correctness are involved, there is a distinction between the
A) real, strict negation: it transforms every true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one, another negation form:
B) Negation: it acts so that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly when its argument does not reach any truth.
Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposition (> nonfactualism) actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense.
        A perfectly reasonable counter-proposal, however, is that A should rather be complementary to the strict concept of the former negation.
Then, in the case that A is merely correct, the valuation of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will be generally conservative.

WrightVsVs: but there are problems at a different end now: the transition of (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only one sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional:

(II) "A" is true> "A" has a truth condition
I 276/277
And any conservative matrix for ""A" is true" endangers this principle in the case where A is not true but correct.
For then the conservative matrix ""a" is true" is evaluated as correct.
The consequent (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Bogh I
Paul Boghossian
Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism Oxford 2007

Boghe I
Peter Boghossian
A manual for Creating Atheists Charlottesville 2013

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Boghossian

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-17