Dictionary of Arguments

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Criteria: do not follow from a definition but must be developed. The criteria for the application of a concept to an object are more concerned with language practice in a community. E.g. the definition of truth does not provide a criterion for which sentences are true.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Metzinger II 719
"Thinking stones"/Birnbacher: for them we have no criterion.
Metzinger II 720
Def Criterion/Wittgenstein: "good reasons" to support a hypothesis. Separated from "symptoms".
Criteria are not strictly logically linked to the term whose fullfilment they indicate, but in the weaker sense of the language game community.
According to Wittgenstein, criteria are not necessary conditions for existence, but they are necessary conditions for attributability.
For example, conduct is not a necessary condition of the occurrence of certain internal states, but nevertheless a necessary condition of the attributability of such states.
Metzinger II 720
Def Symptom/Wittgenstein: empirical correlate to the criteria.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Birn I
D. Birnbacher
Analytische Einführung in die Ethik Berlin 2013

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-21
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