Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Experience: a) reflected perception, which can be compared with prior perceptions and can be processed linguistically. See also events, perception, sensations, empiricism. b) an event that is processed in the consciousness of a subject. No mere imagination. See also events, imagination, consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Peter Bieri on Experience - Dictionary of Arguments
Metzinger I 63 Experiencing/Bieri: sense sensations, colors, sounds, body sensations, moods such as hatred or gaiety, instincts and needs. These states are not only present in us, they "are felt in a certain way". Cf. >D. Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Knowing How. The experiences are only as long as they are conscious. There is no pain and no fear left when the sensations have disappeared. Experiences are the same as they appear. Being experienced is something else than thought, believed or judged. That something feels like this or that is something else than that I take it for this or that. >Emotion, >Reflection, >Representation. The physiological process determines the experience, not vice versa. Metzinger I 72 Causality/explanation/Bieri: if we build it purely physiologically, we know how to continue it, that is, always becoming smaller. This is not possible, however, when the explanation begins with an experience. Then we have to switch to the physiological level somewhere. But then we have changed the subject! Metzinger I 72 Experience/Bieri: it is crucial that there is no difference between appearance and reality. It follows that there is no point in assuming that one can find something else, beyond the sensation, about the nature of an experience. And what would it mean if we had assumed that we had not yet discovered the true nature of pain sensation? We know what pain is! Experience in itself is simple, unstructured. (As for our experience page). Now one might assume that the physiological side, which, for example, can be made visible through PET, would lead us to a hidden complexity! Vs: nevertheless, this only leads us back to our simple experience. Experience/Bieri: maybe we have no experience, maybe our experiences are only opinions? In this way one could dissolve the difference between cognitive consciousness and experience. So cognitive structures without an experience content? This would not help us further, because that would be nothing more than a self-model and self-representation. Metzinger I 63 Experiences/Bieri: experience only exists as long as they are conscious - they are just as they appear - that something feels like this or that is something else than that I take it for this or that. Metzinger I 71 Brain/Consciousness/Experience/Bieri: can we not be satisfied with what we have: covariance, dependency, determination? - no, then we do not understand how our experience can be causally effective - there is a complete causal explanation for everything physiological - therefore consciousness seems to have no significance for any causation - our whole behavior might be alienated - this is not to be excluded because of the causal completeness of physiology. Metzinger I 72 (To) experience/experience/Bieri: the decisive factor here is that there is no difference between appearance and reality - so there is no point in assuming that one can also find something else, beyond the sensation, about the nature of an experience. Metzinger I 74 We have no idea what would count as a solution, as understanding. >Models, >Explanation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Bieri I Peter Bieri Was macht Bewusstsein zu einem Rätsel? In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Bieri III P. Bieri Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
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> Counter arguments against Bieri
> Counter arguments in relation to Experience
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18