Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Paul Benacerraf on Beliefs - Dictionary of Arguments
Field II 373 Belief/empiricism/rules/irrefutability/Benacerraf(1973)(1): if our system of rules were independent of any evidence for a particular physical theory, this would make our belief causally and counterfactually independent of the facts. This would, however, thwart the epistemic value of considerations based on this belief. >Evidence, >Rules, >Knowledge, >Certainty, >Theories, cf. >Empiricism, >Causal explanation, >Causality. Logic/Apriority/Field: it looks at first as if one could also use the argument for a priori belief in logic. >a priori, >Logic. FieldVs: but it is pointless to ask whether logical beliefs depend on logical facts. >Beliefs, >Facts, >Dependence. 1. Benacerraf, P. Mathematical Truth, The Journal of Philosophy 70, 1973, S. 661–679._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Bena I P. Benacerraf Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |