|Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Millikan I 269
Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposing properties: for Aristotle they serve to explain that nothing can originate from nothing.
Definition opposite property/Aristotle: are those who mutually withdraw the foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property!
Change/conversion/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties which are the opposites of the earlier properties.
Opposite/Aristotle: opposite is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then these opposites are bound together at the most fundamental level (in their nature).
Millikan pro Aristotle: with the latter he was right. In Aristotle, there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz.
Properties/contrary/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: he was right in the fact that the assertion that two opposing properties apply to the same substance means to contradict each other. But this is about an indeterminate negation, not about the assertion of a certain absence or; absence is the presence of inconsistency. Example:
Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothingness: e.g. zero acceleration, zero point of temperature, empty space, etc. zero represents a quantity.
Consistency/Law of Consistency/Millikan: is then a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template.
Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle reappears at the level of epistemology:
For example, the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the assertion "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions.
Problem: then it follows from "x is not red": "x does not look red for .. under ...".
Ontological/ontology: this corresponds to the fact that being-non-red would be a void, an absence of red - rather than the opposite of red.
However, it is about that "x is not red" is equivalent to "x does not look red under standard ..." is either empty or false._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005