|Self-identification, philosophy: here we are concerned with the conditions for the ability of a thinking subject to distinguish itself from other subjects or objects in order to relate to itself with language, gestures, and actions. See also private language, privileged access, identification, individuation, introspection, self, I, self-attribution._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Frank I 103
Memory loss/self-identification/I/Anscombe: someone who has lost his memory has not forgotten the use of "I".
Frank I 108
Self-consciousness/Self-Identity/Henry James/Anscombe: E.g. the story of the "poor Baldy" who fell out of the coach and lost his self-consciousness: he asks himself, "Who fell from the carriage? Poor Baldy."
G. Elizabeth M.Anscombe (1975a): The First Person, in:
Samuel Guttenplan (ed.) (I975): Mind and Language: Wolfson College
Lectures 1974, Oxford 1975,45-65_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
G.E. M. Anscombe
"The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank, Frankfurt/M. 1994
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994