Dictionary of Arguments

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Self, philosophy: the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Frank I 91
Self/Anscombe: the self is no Cartesian idea, but it can be combined with a Cartesian ego theory. But this is again derived from a missed reflexive pronoun.
If someone said that the self is connected to a person, then that would be contingent, a happy coincidence!
Another fortunate coincidence would be necessary so that it has something to do with it!
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I 96
Self/Anscombe: it may be very nice to describe what selves are. But if I do not know that I am a self, I cannot mean a self with "I" .


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Anscombe I
G.E. M. Anscombe
"The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36
In
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank, Frankfurt/M. 1994

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-16
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