Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Frank I 87
Reference/Frege/Anscombe: there is no way back from the reference to the meaning. Each object has many modes of givenness or description modes.
Intension/"I"/Anscombe: because of the peculiarity of the construction it succeeds to determine an object, despite the theoretically many possibilities of the way of being given: for we do not want to assume "Smith does not realize the identity with Smith".
If we consider the reflexive in the ordinary sense, this would be possible.
"I"/Special Reflexivum/Anscombe: the special reflexivum can only be explained from the point of view of the first person.
Frege: we have not already understood the meaning when a person is told of what object a person will speak of when he says "I" whether he knows it or not.
However, the use of "I" ensures that the speaker knows it, but we still have a right to ask what he knows!

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-28