|Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.|
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
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|Frank I 87
Reference/Frege/Anscombe: there is no way back from the reference to the meaning. Each object has many modes of givenness or description modes.
Intension/"I"/Anscombe: because of the peculiarity of the construction it succeeds to determine an object, despite the theoretically many possibilities of the way of being given: for we do not want to assume "Smith does not realize the identity with Smith".
If we consider the reflexive in the ordinary sense, this would be possible.
"I"/Special Reflexivum/Anscombe: the special reflexivum can only be explained from the point of view of the first person.
Frege: we have not already understood the meaning when a person is told of what object a person will speak of when he says "I" whether he knows it or not.
However, the use of "I" ensures that the speaker knows it, but we still have a right to ask what he knows!_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994