Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Intensions: intensions are reference objects resulting from a linguistic description, in contrast to the material objects (extensions) that may differ therefrom, whether due to inaccuracies, or by the use of indexical expressions. Examples of intensions are “the oldest person in the room”, “the winner”, “John's favorite quote”, “the one who violates the speed limit”. See also morning star/evening star, extensionality, extension.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Frank I 96
I/Intension/Self/Logic/Anscombe: here the "way of givenness" is unimportant.
The logician understands that "I" in my mouth is just another name for "E.A.".
His rule: if x makes assertions with "I" as subject, then they true and then if the predicates of x are true.
AnscombeVsLogicAnscombeVsKripke: for this reason, he makes the transition from "I" to "Descartes".
But this is too superficial: if you are a speaker who says "I", you cannot find out what it is that says "I". For example, we do not look from which device the sound comes.
Thus, we must require our logicians to assume a "guaranteed" reference of "I".
I 98
Problem: with a guaranteed reference there is no difference between "I" and "A" (see Logic/Anscombe).

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

> Counter arguments against Anscombe
> Counter arguments in relation to Intensions

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-30