|Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Frank I 78
Identity/I/Time/Memory/Locke: Question: How can it be guaranteed that the self who did something some time ago is identical with the self that remembers this act?
Anscombe/Schaede: Anscombe unthinkingly shares the traditional view that the time fell apart into discrete moments, which must first and foremost be related to one another. Then the corresponding successive consciousness moments would have to be synthesized.
But only if this theory is shared, problems arise with the temporal identity of "I".
Frank I 93
I/Self/Memory/Identity/Anscombe: a repeated thought of "I" in conjunction with the same self would have to include a re-identification. But that is not at all part of the role of "I".
On the other hand, it was part of the role of "A". (>Logic/Anscombe).
Frank I 104
I/Identity/Anscombe: when I ask: what carries out my actions? Then the answer is "this object here", "this thing here" but that is not an assertion of identity. The sentences about my actions are verified by my body. But observation does not show me which body is precisely this one.
G. Elizabeth M.Anscombe (1975a): The First Person, in:
Samuel Guttenplan (ed.) (I975): Mind and Language: Wolfson College
Lectures 1974, Oxford 1975,45-65_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
G.E. M. Anscombe
"The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank, Frankfurt/M. 1994
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994