|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself. C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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|Frank I 76
I/Anscombe/Schaede: complicated argumentation:
1) If there is a reference for the expression "I", i.e. a singular entity exists to which "I" refers directly, then Descartes is right, if anyone.
VsDescartes: his theory, however, cannot explain specific peculiarities of the expression "I": e.g. the immunity against misidentification.
So Descartes is wrong and Elisabeth Anscombe is right.
Anscombe thesis "I" has no referees at all!
Course of the argumentation: first, Descartes' position is made as strong as possible to make some brief, almost essayistic remarks on Anscombe's own position at the end.
I/Anscombe: why does it have to be certain? E.g. John Smith himself could not know that he is John Horatio Auberon Smith, who is mentioned somewhere.
He could quote this text and speak of himself without knowing it!
When using "I", only the reference is specified (the speaker), but not the (changing) meaning!
Question: Does "I" work like a proper name? From a logical point of view (where the meaning is not relevant) it does syntactically! E.g. but only an idiot would sign "I".
Uncorrectability (immunity against misidentification): is not yet guaranteed by self-reference.
"I"/Anscombe: the peculiarity of this expression lies in its strict situation-relatedness.
It follows that "I" should not be emphatically substantiated to an "I"!
The question remains: do "I" thoughts imply thoughts with "here" and "this", or is the implication just reversed?
Frank I 99
I/Body/Anscombe: "I" is not identified by the body: e.g. the bishop could mistake the lady's knee for his own, but will he mistake the lady herself for himself?
Fra I 100
Then that for which "I" stands would have to be the Cartesian ego.
Assuming it is my body: e.g. I am in a situation (water tank with lukewarm water, unable to move) where I am practically deprived of my body. However, I can still think, "I do not want this to happen again."
The I is thus not identical with the body.
Thinking is just what is guaranteed by the cogito.
I/Anscombe: for "I" there is only the use!
I/Ambrose Bierce: ("Devil's Dictionary"): ...the idea of two that are I is difficult, but subtle.
I/Anscombe: Thesis solution: "I" is neither a name nor any other type of expression whose logical role it is to refer. (I has no reference).
I/Logic/Anscombe: we still accept the rule of the logician that the proposition is true if the predicates are true. But that is not a sufficient description of "I". Because it does not differentiate between "I" and "A".
The truth definition of the whole sentence does not determine the meaning of the individual phrases.
Accordingly, the logical rule does not justify the idea that "I" from the mouth of x is another name for x.
But the rule means that the question "whose assertion?" was all decisive. For example, a translator could repeat the author's "I". (>quote).
"I am E.A." is not at all an assertion of identity.
An assertion of identity would be: "This thing is E.A."
But there is also the proposition: "I am this thing here"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994