|Haecceitism: the thesis that an object can be fixed by the identification as "this here" to allow further assertions on this subject to be stated. E.g. To claim that in a different world, this object is different. See also identification, identity, logical proper names, anti-haecceitism, index words, > indexicality, individuation, dthat, rigidity, possible worlds._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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|Stalnaker I 112
Counterpart theory/GT/Lewis/Stalnaker: because Lewis himself is a possibilist and the most prominent representative of the counterpart theory, it is true that the most famous arguments for the counterpart theory are possibilistic, but they do not have to be.
The counterpart theory is independent of the conflict between possibilism and actualism. It has quite different arguments for itself.
Stalnaker: I would like to consider the counterpart theory here independently of Lewis' arguments. But it is more about actualism than about possibilism.
Thesis (here on trial): Actualism can combine a belief in primitive deity (haecceitas) (Adams 1979) and a genuine cross-world identity with a version of the counterpart theory, so that contingent identity and difference makes sense.
Contingent Identity/Stalnaker: two things could have been one, and one thing could have been two things.
It will be about connections between metaphysical and semantic questions, the possibility of predication and identity.
Haecceitism/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan 1975).
Surprisingly, the problems do not arise in connection with identity, but with variable binding and quantification._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003