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Stalnaker I 112
Counterpart theory/GT/Lewis/Stalnaker: because Lewis himself is a possibilist and the most prominent representative of the counterpart theory, it is true that the most famous arguments for the counterpart theory are possibilistic, but they do not have to be.
The counterpart theory is independent of the conflict between possibilism and actualism. It has quite different arguments for itself.
Stalnaker: I would like to consider the counterpart theory here independently of Lewis' arguments. But it is more about actualism than about possibilism. Thesis (here on trial): Actualism can combine a belief in primitive deity (haecceitas) (Adams 1979) and a genuine cross-world identity with a version of the counterpart theory, so that contingent identity and difference makes sense.
Contingent Identity/Stalnaker: two things could have been one, and one thing could have been two things.
It will be about the connections between metaphysical and semantic questions, the possibility, the predication and identity.
Haecceitism/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan 1975).
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I 113
Surprisingly, the problems do not arise in connection with identity, but with variable binding and quantification.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-16
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