Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
II 89
Twin earth/fulfilment condition/Searle: what is decisive in the content that the presence of Sally and not twin earth-Sally is one of the fulfilment conditions? - (Qualitatively identical visual experiences) - how to determine that, is not the question, but what has been identified here on Earth before, may fulfill the conditions - SearleVs: this is the viewpoint of the 3rd person, but we need the 1st person.
apropos II 255
Twin Earth: Putnam(s) not a different type of water (tradition) but a different type of liquid.
II 283
Self-reference/Searle: is shown, but not seen - Twin Earth: "this man" different Fregean sense, although experiences are type-identical: perception and expression are self-referential, they would not be satisfied when exchanged - self-reference/Frege's "completing sense": intentional contents are never undefined (SearleVsQuine: no undefined sailboat can be desired).
II 316
Twin Earth/reference/Searle: reference cannot rely on descriptive content, our names would still relate with identical perceptual situation to our domestic objects - SearleVsPutnam: causal self-reference is not enough.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-26