Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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II 89
Twin earth/fulfilment condition/Searle: what is decisive in the content that the presence of Sally and not twin earth-Sally is one of the fulfilment conditions? - (Qualitatively identical visual experiences) - how to determine that, is not the question, but what has been identified here on Earth before, may fulfill the conditions - SearleVs: this is the viewpoint of the 3rd person, but we need the 1st person.
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apropos II 255
Twin Earth: Putnam(s) not a different type of water (tradition) but a different type of liquid.
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II 283
Self-reference/Searle: is shown, but not seen - Twin Earth: "this man" different Fregean sense, although experiences are type-identical: perception and expression are self-referential, they would not be satisfied when exchanged - self-reference/Frege's "completing sense": intentional contents are never undefined (SearleVsQuine: no undefined sailboat can be desired).
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II 316
Twin Earth/reference/Searle: reference cannot rely on descriptive content, our names would still relate with identical perceptual situation to our domestic objects - SearleVsPutnam: causal self-reference is not enough.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-28