Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 17
Two-Dimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: connects propositional thoughts with sentences. - (s), i.e. that in a different possible world something else can be meant with the same expressions. - The A-intension (independent of possible worlds) is then usually the only one to which the speaker has cognitive access - epistemological status: is therefore determined by the modal state of the A-intension. - ((s) What can be known depends on the proposition (content) of the possible world-independent expression).
I 18
Two-Dimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: can show how the possible and the true interact, i.e. separate semantic questions from factual ones in the context.
I 19
But it does not provide a context-free canonical language in which we could provide a neutral view of the possibility space.
I 192
Def contingent a priori/Two-Dimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: a statement with a contingent secondary intension but not necessarily a primary one. - Def necessary a posteriori: other way round: necessary secondary intension, contingent primary. - Important argument: no proposition is itself contingent a priori or necessary a posteriori. There are only different ways in which necessary and contingent propositions are associated with statements.
I 192
Def Character/Kaplan: = meaning - function of possible (use) contexts on references - external: Newen/Schrenk: the character is the whole table of two-dimensional semantics. - Kaplan thesis: character and content must be separated. - Character/Meaning: is a rule that says how the reference is determined by facts about the context. - Content/Kaplan: = secondary intension. - Content: possibly unknown despite language skills. - ((s)> E.g. gods) - Character/(s): E.g. who it could be in each case. - Content: who it actually is. - E.g. to whom "I" refers.
I 194
Content/Secondary intension: can be different in different possible worlds a) because the context is different - b) because the meaning is different. - ((s) This part of meta-semantics).
I 199
Two-Dimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: should be interpreted meta-semantically, not semantically.
I 199
Meta-Semantics/Stalnaker: is fact dependent, therefore no access to a priori truth. - Semantics: must assume internal states.
I 212
Two-Dimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: primary propositions: they are the ones that represent the cognitive values ​​of our thoughts. - Secondary Propositions/semantic: for him, the secondary propositions are described and not expressed - secondary Proposition/Semantic: they are unambiguously defined as a function of the facts. - Problem: they are not something to which we have cognitive access.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29