Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
V 16
Double indexing/double index/possible worlds/counterfactual conditional/Lewis: Counterfactual conditionals are contingent in general - so we need double indexing - i.e. that certain phrases are not absolutely true/false - but in relation to a world j - Let F be a special sentence which is true in j relative to i iff j f (A, i) (similar world) . - then F A > C is true in j relative to i, if j belongs to f (A, i), C is true in j ( If..., if...).
Definition operator $/spelling dollars for death Cross/Lewis: $ B is true in i relative to j iff B is true in i relative to i itself.
Definition counterfactual conditional/Lewis: - A >> C = definition $ N (F A > C) - so that we have a choice function brought into the object language.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-27