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|Frank I 641f
Other Minds/Mental States/Strawson: one has to be both: self- and external attributor - Rorty: self-attribution originally based on the same type of observation as attribution - WittgensteinVsRorty: self-attribution without clues - DavidsonVsRorty: does not show that the attributions with/without clues affect the same entities.
Strawson I 127
StrawsonVsChisholm indirect attribution of direct attribution - ChisholmVsStrawson: reversed - ((s) Strawson: perhaps only theoretical possibility that has to be presumed.)
Attribution/Gap/Strawson: no logical gap between self- and external attribution - otherwise depression disappears - solution: special character of P predicates: that they can be attributed both to themselves and to others - I 142 Analogy: Signs on playing cards identify them (criterion), but their meaning for the game goes beyond that - I 144 Difference. Self-attribution not because of observation - but predicates are no solution to the mind-body problem.
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994