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|Frank I 641f
Other Minds/Mental States/Strawson: one has to be both: self- and external attributor - Rorty: self-attribution originally based on the same type of observation as attribution - WittgensteinVsRorty: self-attribution without clues - DavidsonVsRorty: does not show that the attributions with/without clues affect the same entities.
Strawson I 127
StrawsonVsChisholm indirect attribution of direct attribution - ChisholmVsStrawson: reversed - ((s) Strawson: perhaps only theoretical possibility that has to be presumed.)
Attribution/Gap/Strawson: no logical gap between self- and external attribution - otherwise depression disappears - solution: special character of P predicates: that they can be attributed both to themselves and to others - I 142 Analogy: Signs on playing cards identify them (criterion), but their meaning for the game goes beyond that - I 144 Difference. Self-attribution not because of observation - but predicates are no solution to the mind-body problem._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994