|Attribution: statements that provide an object with properties are attributions. See also self-ascription, predication._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Chisholm: Direct Attribution/Direct Ascription: self-ascription, only security, basis of any reference - indirect attribution: to someone or something else.
Chisholm: direct attribution: instead of self-attribution (exception E.g. Mach) - P1 self-identity from direct attribution - P2 what is being attributed is a property - D1 Meaning: direct attribution - indirect attribution: to someone else, derived from direct attribution. - basic concept: the property of being-F so that x attributes it directly to y - ((s) from this should follow: x = y).
Any kind of reference can be understood with the help of self-ascription - 1) The meaning person must be able to turn themselves into an object, 2) He must understand propositions and facts - direct attribution (self-attribution) original form of all attributions.
But not yet self-awareness: this also requires the knowledge that it is the subject itself to which the properties are attributed.
Indirect Attribution/Chisholm: about identifying relations: there is a certain Rel R which is so that you are the thing to which I stand in R - (irreversible) - in that, I directly attribute a specific two-sided property to myself: that the thing to which I stand in R, is a thing that is F (E.g. wears a hat) - but this second part does not need to be right
Confusion/Forgery/Chisholm: attributes properties to one of which it is thought that they belong to the other._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004