Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
V 111
Coincidence/Lewis: If coincidences did not supervene on facts (LewisVs), then no theories of coincidence - ((s)Vs: not if Definition coincidence/(s): not independence but range of possible reaction - Lewis: a different pattern would bring about an entirely different theory - then the theory of coincidence itself is not something that has a certain chance - Important argument: then several possible worlds are not something that has different story chance conditionals - then the theory of coincidence would be necessary (for each possible world) - then it is just about historical information - problem: if I know the pre-history, there is only one reasonable belief function - LewisVs: 1) so little room for maneuvre is not reasonable - 2) it is unlikely that the properties of the world should not supervene on certain facts.
V 175
Coincidence/Causing/Lewis: even random events are caused.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Coincidence

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25