Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Coincidence: coincidence is not the absence of a causal explanation, but the coinciding of several events, which were caused by independent causal chains. The determination of a coincidence belongs to the description level and may express the deviation from an expectation. The property of being accidental is not inherent to events. See also determinism, indeterminism, contingency, necessity, probability._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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N. Cartwright on Coincidence - Dictionary of Arguments
I 201 Coincidence/Explanation/Causality/Aristotle/Cartwright: (Aristotle, Physica II, Chap. 5): E.g. random meeting in the market square: causal explanation: everyone goes to market with motivations that only apply to themselves, both meet there by chance, because the scheme of motivations and abilities explains the presence of each of them, but not their meeting. Important argument: but that does not mean that the meeting was not a real physical incident, nor does it mean that it could not be predicted from the individual factors. It just means that meeting as meeting has no causal explanation in the scheme. ((s)> "qua"). >Qua-objects, >Explanation, >Causal explanation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |