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|Rorty VI 147
Indicative Definition/demonstrate/language/Wittgenstein: indicative definition presupposes that in the language a lot has been prepared already, demonstrating is insufficient without language to single out something. (Dennett pro, SearleVs, NagelVs).
Hintikka I 95
Tell/demonstrate/logical proper name/Russell/Hintikka: "this" cannot be pronounced, only mentioned. - ((s)> mention/use) - ((s) not pronounced in absence.) - ((s) The object can therefore not be mentioned.).
We can only point to the objects of acquaintance.
Demonstrate/tell/Tractatus/acquaintance/Russell/Hintikka: we can only point at the objects of acquaintance - (> Logical proper names).
Indicative demonstration/ostension/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: cannot provide a criterion of continuous identity. - This is why not anything that can be demonstrated is an object.
Demonstrate/ostensive definition/ostension/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: sense data can only be defined by demonstrating. - Problem: must the demonstration itself be understood? - Hintikka: the listener must probably already know the logic state of the defined entity. - "there"/"this": if, at all, to introduce by ostension, then the demonstration must be quite different in this case. - Hintikka: Wittgenstein hesitates long before he drops the indicative definition. - An alternative to the concept of meaning and attribution of meaning is hard to find. - Demonstration/Wittgenstein: basic concept: binary relation of naming. (by a name) (WittgensteinVs).
Middle period: successful indicative definition can provide rules for the use.
Demonstrate/ostension/Wittgenstein: E.g. "this is green" does not provide information about a connection between green and reality. - "This" is used as an equal sign.
Language/rule/indicative definition/Wittgenstein: E.g. This is gray can either
a) be a sentence or - b) a rule or a definition of language use.
Ostensive definition/demonstrate/ostension/Wittgenstein: E.g. one shows someone a red square with the words "that is red". - Then it may be that he calls squares red in future.
Ostensive/Wittgenstein/Bezzel: pointless because words are no names.
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996