Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
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I 54
Pointing/McDowell: What we are finally encountering is a content that is still conceivable, and not something that would be more fundamental, namely, a naked pointing or a piece of givenness.
We do not stop with our seeing just before the facts (Wittgenstein) we see that something is so and so.
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I 64
Pointing/McDowell: we fall victim to the myth of what is given when we assume that the pointing gestures had to break through a boundary which surrounds the sphere of conceivable content.
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I 194
Ostension/Concept/McDowell: E.g. "It looks like this" - does not have to be any less conceptual than what it is a reason for.
We can only get to grips with the rational relationship if we understand it conceptually, even if, according to our theory (Evans), the content would not be conceptual.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001


> Counter arguments against McDowell

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-25