|Signs: signs are recognizable and definable forms that an observer can assign to two domains. The first domain is the repertoire of available forms that allows a distinction of similarity and dissimilarity within this domain, the second domain is a set of objects which also distinguishes between similarity and dissimilarity between these objects as well as distinguishing the objects of the second domain from the forms of the first domain. There are no signs without observation or interpretation. See also language, words, symbols, icons, systems, image, image theory, pictures, assignment._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Sign/TugrendhatVsHusserl: Is there not always something for special function - characterization - then the whole theory of categorical acts is purely a thought theory without regard to signs - use here the same as function - Characterization/Tugendhat: the same as classifying or distinguishing.
"Natural signs"/Tugendhat: signs: E.g. browning of the leaves in autumn, that it will thunder soon, etc. - no intention, no object, but facts.
Signs/Tugendhat: do not occur in the place of the objects, but in the place of a fictitious sign-free reference - (>proxy).
The linguistic signs do not represent other functions that would be possible without them._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992