Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Signs: signs are recognizable and definable forms that an observer can assign to two domains. The first domain is the repertoire of available forms that allows a distinction of similarity and dissimilarity within this domain, the second domain is a set of objects which also distinguishes between similarity and dissimilarity between these objects as well as distinguishing the objects of the second domain from the forms of the first domain. There are no signs without observation or interpretation. See also language, words, symbols, icons, systems, image, image theory, pictures, assignment._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ch.S. Peirce on Signs - Dictionary of Arguments
Berka I 29 Sign/Logic/Peirce: in Logic all three types of signs must occur. Symbols: without it there is no universality. Universality: essential for conclusions. >Icons/Peirce, >Icons, >Logic, >Conclusions. Berka I 30 Problem: a symbol alone says nothing about the subject matter. - A general term can only allude to an object. >Generality. Conclusion/Peirce: needs in addition to symbol (for truth) and index (both together (for sentence formation) the 3rd character: the icon: because inference consists in the observation that where certain relations exist, some other relations can be found. >Conclusion, >Symbols, >Icons, >Relations. These relations must be represented by an icon - e.g. the middle term of the syllogism must actually occur in both premises.(1) >Syllogisms, >Premises. Berka I 29 Symbol/Peirce: the symbol says nothing about the subject.(1) >Indexicality, >Ostension, >Pointing, >Ostensive definition. 1. Ch. S. Peirce, On the algebra of logic. A contribution to the philosophy of notation. American Journal of Mathematics 7 (1885), pp. 180-202 – Neudruck in: Peirce, Ch. S., Collected Papers ed. C. Hartstone/P. Weiss/A. W. Burks, Cambridge/MA 1931-1958, Vol. III, pp. 210-249 --- Diaz-Bone I 68f Sign/Peirce/VsKant: VsConstruction of the transcendental Subject: pragmatism is the method that enables successful linguistic and mental communication and clear ideas. For Peirce, every thought is a sign. >Subject/Kant, >I. Kant, >Transcendentals, >Thoughts, >Pragmatism. --- Eco I 114 Sign/Peirce/Eco: triadic form: base: symbol (represented) object (that it represents) Tip: interpretant (many authors want to equate this with signifier or reference). >Reference, Signifier, >Significant._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Peir I Ch. S. Peirce Philosophical Writings 2011 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19