Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Signs: signs are recognizable and definable forms that an observer can assign to two domains. The first domain is the repertoire of available forms that allows a distinction of similarity and dissimilarity within this domain, the second domain is a set of objects which also distinguishes between similarity and dissimilarity between these objects as well as distinguishing the objects of the second domain from the forms of the first domain. There are no signs without observation or interpretation. See also language, words, symbols, icons, systems, image, image theory, pictures, assignment._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P. Geach on Signs - Dictionary of Arguments
I 204 Sentence/name/abbreviation/substitute/proxy/Geach: e.g. if "P" and "Q" are abbreviations of sentences and "A" and "B", the respective names of these sentences, then we could have a convention, by which "A > B" is the name (abbreviation) of the sentence "P > Q". >Name of a sentence, >Level/Order, >Names, >Descriptions. Autonymous/Carnap: the symbol ">" in "A > B", is used as a sign of itself, autonymous. - (Geach per) >Logical constants, >Logical connectives, >Sign, >Symbol._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16