Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Knowledge: Knowledge is a conscious relationship to sentences or propositions, which legitimately attributes to them truth or falsehood. What is known is true. Conversely, it does not apply that everything that is true is also known. See also knowledge how, propositional knowledge, realism, abilities, competence, truth, facts, situations, language, certainty, beliefs, omniscience, logical knowledge, reliability

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Bertrand Russell on Knowledge - Dictionary of Arguments

Frank I 654ff
Proposition/Knowledge/Russell: one can know propositions, even if one is not familiar with all components.

Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58
- - -
Russell IV 116
Knowledge/wrong knowledge/false knowledge/Russell: E.g. Someone thinks that the name of the Prime Minister starts with B (Bannerman is correct) - but he thinks Balfour was Prime Minister - no true knowledge.
- - -
Hintikka 167
Knowledge/who/what/where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze constructions of the form white + W sentence. General:
(10) a knows who (e.g., x) is such that A (x)
becomes
(11) (Ex) a knows that A (x).
Hintikka: but this is only possible if we modify Russell's approach:
Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be traced back to the non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed with Russell's theory of descriptions (ThdK).
Problem: for each person, there are a lot of people whose names the person knows and of whose existence the person knows, but of whom the person does not know who they are. ((s) celebrities, people of whom one has heard, hear-say) not aquaintance, but by description.
I 168
Charles Dodgson, for instance, was for Queen Victoria one person she had heard of, but she did not know herself.
Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10) it applies:
(12) ~ (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x
But this is trivially wrong, even according to Russell.
The following is certainly true:
(13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson
Existential Generalization/EG: results then in:
(14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x
So exactly the negation of (12) is a contradiction.
Descriptions/Hintikka: descriptions are not involved here at all. Therefore Russell's theory of descriptions cannot help here.
I 170
Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Uniqueness/Russell/Hintikka: What ways Russell could have taken?
Knowledge-who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge who did something with the existence of an individual of whom is known that it has done so.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2022-01-28
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