Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Knowledge: Knowledge is a conscious relationship to sentences or propositions, which legitimately attributes to them truth or falsehood. What is known is true. Conversely, it does not apply that everything that is true is also known. See also knowledge how, propositional knowledge, realism, abilities, competence, truth, facts, situations, language, certainty, beliefs, omniscience, logical knowledge, reliability

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Frank I 654 ~
Proposition/knowledge/Russell: one can know propositions, even if one is not familiar with all components.
-- -
Russell IV 116
Knowledge/Wrong Knowledge/Russell: E.g. Someone thinks that the name of the Prime Minister starts with B (Bannerman is correct) - but he thinks Balfour was Prime Minister - no true knowledge.
Hintikka 167
Knowledge/who/what/where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze constructions of the form white + W sentence. General:
(10) a knows who (e.g., x) is such that A (x)
(11) (Ex) a knows that A (x).
Hintikka: but this is only possible if we modify Russell's approach:
Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be traced back to the non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed with Russell's theory of descriptions (ThdK).
Problem: for each person, there are a lot of people whose names the person knows and of whose existence the person knows, but of whom it does not know who they are. ((s) celebrities, people of whom one has heard, hear-say) not aquaintance, but by description.
I 168
Charles Dodgson, for instance, was for Queen Victoria one person she had heard of, but she did not know herself.
Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10) it applies:
(12) ~ (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x)
But this is trivially wrong, even according to Russell.
The following is certainly true:
(13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson)
Existential generalization/EG: results then in:
(14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x)
So exactly the negation of (12) contradiction.
Descriptions/Hintikka: descriptions are not involved here at all. Therefore Russell's theory of descriptions cannot help here.
I 170
Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Uniqueness/Russell/Hintikka: What ways Russell could have taken?
Knowledge-who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge who did something with the existence of an individual of whom is known that it has done so.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-25