|Knowledge: Knowledge is a conscious relationship to sentences or propositions, which legitimately attributes to them truth or falsehood. What is known is true. Conversely, it does not apply that everything that is true is also known. See also knowledge how, propositional knowledge, realism, abilities, competence, truth, facts, situations, language, certainty, beliefs, omniscience, logical knowledge, reliability_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Knowledge/Counterfactual Conditional/co.co./Nozick: E.g. I know that a pair of scissors is now in my drawer. - But it is not correct to say that if there is one there, that I would know then. - ((S) So something can be true, even if the counterfactual conditional is false - namely, because the method can be crucial). - ((s) So the counterfactual conditional must mention the method.).
Gettier/Nozick: Gettier - examples conclude a truth often from a (justified believed) falsehood. - condition
(3) if not-p> not- (S believes that p)
excludes that often.
Knowledge/belief/Nozick: through senile stubborness knowledge becomes belief. - Similar: E.g. knowledge of future brainwashing, then we try to "cement" belief.
Knowledge/belief/local/global/Nozick: condition (3) should be better (indexicality, "now", "here") a local belief than a global one. - Otherwise danger of stubbornness.
Need/possibility/knowledge/Nozick: if ~ p> ~ (S believes that p) necessary condition for knowledge, then possibility of skepticism shows that no knowledge exists.
II 204 f
Knowledge/non-seclusion/NozickVsskepticism: Knowledge is not completed under known logical implication (VsSkepticism - Skepticism: knowledge is complete: that is the (skeptical) principle of seclusion of knowledge: K (p >> q) & Kp> Kq: I should know allegedly the implied by the known? - Nozick: but that would be merely belief, not knowledge.
The situation where q is wrong, could be quite different from the one where p is false. - E.g. that you were born in a certain city, implies that you were born on Earth, but not vice versa.
Non-seclusion of knowledge: means, that knowledge will vary with the facts, because it is in connection with them. - (> Covariance) - notation: K = knowledge, operator "somebody knows".
Knowledge/belief/closeness/Nozick: merely true belief is complete under known logical implication. - Because knowledge is more true belief, we need an additional condition that is not-complete under implication. - Belief is only knowledge when it covaries with facts. - But that is not enough - it depends on what happens if p is false. - Problem: a co-varying belief with facts is not complete. - Punchline: because knowledge involves belief, it is not completed. - VsSkepticism: his argument needs the fact that knowledge needs covariance.
Knowledge/induction/connection/Nozick: knowledge is based on facts that would otherwise have been different - Nozick: In the past. - Therefore, the relevant non-p-world is not a possible world, which is so far identical with the real world (the actual world), and diverges from now on immediately. - It is probably logically possible that it begins to diverge in a moment. - ((s) elsewhere Lewis like Nozick: in the past there would have had to be a change, if I now suddenly act differently). - We have connections to the facts in the past that determine our predictions. -> Covariance.
Knowing that (x)Px is unequal knowledge that every single thing is P: the all-quantification has different truth conditions as the all-removal. - "(x)Px" could be wrong, although "Pa" true._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981
The Nature of Rationality 1994